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Abstract
This paper analyses the relative distribution of gross fixed capital formation across industrial
sectors in EU-regions, i.e. the level of relative regional investment specialisation, for the
period between 1985 and 1994. Controlling for heteroscedasticity, potential endogeneity as
well as spatial dependence, we get consistent econometric results. Larger market and regional
sizes diminish relative investment specialisation while a higher unemployment rate,
population density, the fact of being a central region, the distance to the economic centre, and
economic liberalisation increase its level. The variation of the specialisation level of one
region over time, however, cannot be explained econometrically, it thus might underlie
random disturbances.
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Since Krugman has assumed increasing core-periphery tendencies due to stronger industrial
agglomeration in an economically integrated Europe, controversial discussions about this prediction
have risen. However, the seminal study of Krugman comparing EU and US regional specialisation
levels bases on mobile labour. But this high mobility of employees across US states contrasts sharply
with the low mobility of labour across the EU. Results on specialisation tendencies for US states
which base on employment data can therefore not simply be extended to EU countries or regions.
Neglecting capital, though, might lead to disturbed results – especially inside the EU where we face an
increasing mobility of capital which is enforced by the EMU and financial market integration. This
study therefore aims at identifying the economic determinants of the (un)even relative regional
allocation of capital across industries. Its focus is on regional patterns as a profound analysis of the
homogeneity of regional, not national, economic structures is still missing in recent research.
We consider regional data of the Eurostat REGIO database for the period between 1985 and 1994. Our
focus is on NUTS 1- as well as on NUTS 2-regions – the latter being further disaggregated than the
former. 56 NUTS 2- and 33-NUTS 1-regions from seven EU countries are included: France, Italy,
Belgium, UK, Ireland, Denmark, and Luxembourg. Ireland, Denmark, and Luxembourg, however, are
mono-regional countries at NUTS 1- and NUTS 2-level, i.e. they are not disaggregated any further. In
order to capture the degree to which EU-regions differ in their investment structures, indices of
regional investment specialisation are calculated for each region and each year. In order to capture
relative regional specialisation levels, investment shares are analysed in relation to the average EU
sectoral shares.
One important, but unsurprising feature that can be detected is the higher level of relative investment
specialisation when regarding the more disaggregated NUTS 2-regions in comparison to the NUTS 1-
regions. In a descriptive analysis of the most and the least specialised regions within each country, we
find higher specialised regions to perform worse in economic terms than lower specialised regions
with respect to unemployment rate, number of patents, total regional GDP and total regional GFCF.
The fact that the distribution of relative investment shares of peripheral regions is more uneven than in
the core regions while these regions are of poorer economic performance, already stresses the
importance for the EU and its member countries not to neglect their focus on economic development
of peripheral regions. Economic centres, especially the region of Bruxelles and the Île de France, are
highly specialised as well. However, they demonstrate a large potential of high economic
performance. As no causal relationship can be derived from this purely descriptive analysis,
econometric analyses are conducted to test for the significance of potential determinants of the even or
uneven relative allocation of investments across sectors within a region.
The theoretical basis for the empirical investigation of the determinants of regional specialisation and
the concentration of economic activity is vast. According to traditional trade theories, regional
specialisation takes place in accordance with comparative advantages. The regional economics’
polarisation theory stresses the potential cumulative causation of factor agglomeration in the centre
and backwash effects for peripheral regions. Gravity models focus on centripetal forces such as market
size and centrifugal forces such as transport costs and imperfect economic integration or liberalisation.
Finally, the New Economic Geography finds transaction costs and economies of scale to explain
among others the concentration of sectors in space. The core thus specialises in sectors with high
economies of scale, the periphery in sectors with low or constant economies of scale.
We conduct GLS-estimates accounting for potential heteroscedasticity, instrumental-variable estimates
accounting for possible endogeneity between the dissimilarity indicator and some of its determinants
as well as a dynamic specification capturing possible first-order serial correlation effects. In addition, a
logistic transformation was used to take account of the endogenous variable’s restriction to the range
between zero and one. Since we deal with regional developments, we cannot exclude spatial
interdependencies as well as measurement errors leading to spatial autocorrelation effects. We
therefore additionally run spatial econometric estimates to control for the potential spatial dependence
and to check for the robustness of our results obtained by classical econometric methods. All
estimations lead to very similar results and provide evidence of a high importance of regional size,market size, the unemployment rate as well as the location in the centre or the periphery, population
density, economic openness as well as capital market integration.
The bigger the size of a region is, the higher is the similarity of relative investments. Market size
reflects the economic and demand potential of a region: The higher it is, the lower the level of relative
specialisation in terms of investments tends to be. This is in contrast to the results of recent empirical
studies on sectoral agglomeration which found market size to have an increasing influence on the
concentration across space. While firms tend to locate close to large markets and high demand (thus
increasing sectoral concentration), regions with a large market seem to attract capital of all types of
sectors with a rather even relative allocation (thus decreasing relative regional dissimilarities). This
effect is counteracted by an apparently strong tendency towards high specialisation of central,
economically most important regions who demonstrate to have a significantly higher level of relative
investment specialisation. Equally, population density increases the specialisation level. The
unemployment rate, finally, reflects negative economic performance of a region (not accounting for
migration effects etc.). The higher it is, the stronger the level of relative regional specialisation turns
out to be. The higher the distance of a region to the economic centre is, the less similar are its
investment shares to EU average. Peripheral regions are thus stronger specialised in terms of relative
investments than regions closer to the centre.
In addition, the impacts of economic openness and the influence of capital market integration are
tested in separate estimates. Both indicators, however, are not available at the regional level, but only
at the country level. They therefore might pick up country-specific effects in cross-sectional analyses.
However, reliable results on the impact of liberalisation tendencies are gained in the pooled
regressions when we are able to exploit the indicators’ variation over time while efficiently controlling
for country-specific effects. Both, the extent of capital market integration as well as economic
openness consistently seem to have a significant increasing impact on relative specialisation levels of
gross fixed capital formation.
The spatial econometric analyses, controlling for spatial interdependencies, provide strong evidence
for the robustness of the above described economic phenomena. In addition, the regressions display
negative spatial dependence either due to negative spillovers or simply due to data measurement
errors.
Comparing results for NUTS 2- and the more aggregated NUTS 1-level, we find them to be similar.
Only the regional size does not show a significant influence on the similarity of relative investment
shares in NUTS 1-regions. As NUTS 1-regions are higher aggregated and usually consist of a number
of NUTS 2-regions, their size differs much less than at NUTS 2-level. In addition, bigger regions are
logically more diversified in relative investments than smaller regions. Thus, this result is not
surprising.
By means of fixed effects estimates, there are only few significant impacts to be detected. The region-
specific constants all turn out to be highly significant in the fixed effects estimates. Consistently, we
find only low explanatory power of further exogenous variables when controlling for region-specific
effects. Regional characteristics like regional gross domestic product, the regional unemployment rate,
regional size, the distance to the economic centre as well as the fact of being a central region thus
seem to determine the respective level of specialisation to a large extent. The variation over time,
though, is not explained by our regressions. In addition, the extent of market integration and thus of
European integration seems to strengthen relative specialisation tendencies.1
I Introduction

Since Krugman (1991) has assumed increasing core-periphery tendencies due to stronger in-
dustrial agglomeration in an economically integrated Europe, controversial discussions about
this prediction have risen. On the one hand, regional specialisation leads to a number of ad-
vantages. Firms or whole industries are able to benefit from economies of scale and intra-
industrial linkages to a higher extent. On the other hand, the strong regional specialisation
increases the potential risk of asymmetric shocks. Specialisation tendencies thus lead to the
need of improved or new shock absorbing mechanisms on the national and even regional
level, whereas inside EMU, monetary policy is centralised at the European level.
The seminal study of Krugman which confronts a lower level of specialisation in the EU with
a higher one in the US is based on the analysis of mobile labour. But the high mobility of em-
ployees across US states contrasts sharply with that across the EU. Results on specialisation
tendencies for US states which rely on employment data can therefore not simply be extended
to EU countries or regions. In addition, inside the EU, an increasing mobility of capital en-
forced by European Monetary Union (EMU) and increased financial market integration can
be observed
1. Due to the possible substitution of capital and labour as factors of production,
the allocation of capital might reflect specialisation tendencies inside the EU which cannot be
detected when restricting investigations to labour. However, up to now theoretical and de-
scriptive analyses on the distribution of economic activity focus on the production factor la-
bour and are only rarely extended to production or trade data. The allocation of capital (in-
vestments and/or direct investments), however, has been neglected so far, but is subject of the
analysis in Stirboeck (2001) and in European Commission (1999). In addition, a profound
analysis of the homogeneity of regional, not national, economic structures is still neglected in
recent research. Exceptions are the studies of Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (1999),
Tirado, Paluzie and Pons (2000) as well as Stirboeck (2001).
The purpose of this study is to investigate the regional distribution of investment across in-
dustrial sectors, i.e. the level of regional specialisation, inside the EU with the emphasis on
the identification of important determinants of relative investment dissimilarities in EU-
regions and the impact of EU-integration on these regional developments. Determinants of
regional specialisation tendencies are given by theoretical models of the international trade
theory, regional economics as well as the new economic geography. In section II, these are
shortly summarised and the results of recent econometric analyses on the allocation of pro-
duction and their empirical determinants are given.
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1 All restrictions on long- and even short-term capital movements within EU are formally prohibited since the
passing of the EU-Council directive 88/361/EEC in June 1988. However, a large number of exceptions to this
directive have existed for very long. Even according to the IMF Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions 2000,
some of them were still persisting in 1999 – the year of the instauration of EMU. In addition to these national
administrative barriers, the segmentation of European capital markets also impeded the perfect liberalisation of
capital movements. However, the European Common Market as well as the preparation and installation of EMU
have exerted a great pressure on the implementation of perfect and unhindered capital mobility and have already
improved market integration. For details, see e.g. the recent studies of Santillán, Bayle and Thygesen (2000),
European Commission (2000) as well as Danthine, Giavazzi and von Thaden (2000).2
Our econometric investigations on the determinants of the similar or dissimilar relative allo-
cation of sectoral gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) within regions are then presented in
section III. Data refer to the period 1985 to 1994 and to two different aggregation levels of the
Eurostat nomenclature of territorial units (NUTS – Nomenclature des unités territoriales) of
seven EU countries: NUTS 1- and NUTS 2-regions. NUTS 2-regions, the less aggregated
geographical entities, are of particular importance as EU regional policy is implemented at
NUTS 2-level. We run, for the 10 separate years, cross-sectional as well as pooled regressions
by use of GLS- and IV-estimates as well as pooled regressions in logit terms. In addition,
fixed effects (within) estimates and between estimates are conducted to control for different
effects in the process of the potentially dissimilar regional specialisation of EU-regions. Since
we deal with regional developments, we cannot exclude spatial interdependencies as well as
measurement errors leading to spatial error autocorrelation. Spatial econometric estimates are
therefore additionally run to control for the potential spatial dependence and to check for the
robustness of our results obtained by classical econometric methods.
In these econometric analyses, we can detect that a higher market size as well as the size of a
region decrease the regional level of relative investment specialisation while a higher rate of
unemployment, number of patents as well as population density, the fact of being a central
region, and the distance to the economic centre increase it. A higher level of economic open-
ness or of capital market integration also leads to stronger structural dissimilarity. These re-
sults are confirmed in the spatial econometric estimates where we are confronted with an ad-
ditional negative spatial dependence between nearby regions.
II  Explaining regional specialisation tendencies
In traditional trade theory, the level of regional specialisation and thus the concentration of
economic activity is assumed to be in accordance with comparative advantages. Regions spe-
cialise to a larger extent in case of economic openness and market integration. Agglomeration
tendencies such as a high density of population, capital or (sectoral) economic activity in only
one regional area and a disequilibrium in economic developments are not to be expected.
Gravity models in international economics (Tinbergen, 1962; Linnemann, 1966) explain eco-
nomic flows between regions through gravitational and resistance forces such as market size
or market potential, distance, barriers to international activity etc. The spatial concentration of
e.g. investments can thus be the result of gravitational forces. These forces will gain impor-
tance when resistance forces, such as transport costs or imperfect integration, go down.
The new economic geography has sharply increased the importance of regional economic
theory in the 1990s. It has induced a new wave of attention to concentration and specialisation
patterns. However, already before the 1990s, polarisation theories in the framework of re-
gional economics have provided explanations of circular and cumulative agglomeration ten-
dencies due to “forward and backward linkages” (Hirschman, 1958) or “backwash-effects”
(Myrdal, 1957) which are unfortunate for peripheral regions. Since Krugman (1991), the new
economic geography has gained a special focus of attention as according to these models,
specialisation need not – like in the neo-classical world – to develop according to the com-
parative advantage of regions, but can be the result of historical conditions and macroeco-
nomic (partly random) processes. Thus even similar regions can develop differently and the
resulting patterns of specialisation are ex ante unpredictable. Due to the existence of econo-
mies of scale at the level of plants (further increased by economies of localisation at the in-
dustrial level), firms do not produce at each single place of local demand. Instead, the pro-
duction of each differentiated good is locally concentrated and close to large markets. The3
core thus specialises in economic activity underlying increasing economies of scale, the pe-
riphery in agriculture or industries with constant or low economies of scale. In case of high
transport costs, the allocation of production over space is rather persistent. Transport costs
(also proxying transaction costs) are a centrifugal force working against the spatial concentra-
tion of production. Decreasing transport costs, though, strengthen the centripetal force of
economies of scale and might thus be a trigger for the concentration of production.
However, the concentration of production in the core can decrease again as soon as transport
costs reach a critical low level (Venables, 1996; Krugman and Venables 1995). The reason for
this is the dispersing influence of low wages in the periphery which is strong enough when
transport costs are sufficiently low. Production in the periphery will then be expanded as im-
mobile labour does not migrate to the core regions although these are marked by higher
wages. This theoretical approach therefore predicts an inverse U-shaped development of con-
centration.
In spite of the growing number of theoretical and empirical studies on the location of indus-
tries, econometric studies on regional economic structures are still rare. Recent econometric
studies investigating concentration tendencies of production across EU countries are Amiti
(1999) and Haaland et al. (1999) as well as Tirado, Paluzie and Pons (2000) focusing on in-
dustrial shares in Spanish regions in the 19th century. The level of the industrial specialisation
of regions of – among others – three EU countries, finally, is focussed on by Kalemli-Ozcan,
Sorensen and Yosha (1999).
Amiti (1999) gets evidence for significant, positive effects of economies of scale and inter-
mediate good intensities on the concentration of industries across five European countries in
addition to mostly significant positive fixed industry and time effects which are not explained
by the model. Fixed time effects have been increasing over time which according to the
author might pick up trade liberalisation effects. In Haaland et al. (1999), the most important
determinant for the relative sectoral concentration turns out to be market size, i.e. industries
tend to locate close to larger markets. A smaller, but significant effect is also found for labour
intensity, i.e. skill-intensive industries seem to concentrate in countries offering highly skilled
labour. By use of spatial econometrics, Tirado, Paluzie and Pons (2000) empirically confirm
that the industrial intensity (i.e. the share of industrial production in total production) of
Spanish provinces strongly increased in the 19
th century. It was influenced negatively by the
province’s share of population, and positively by human capital endowment, relative size of
the province’s market, and the extent of large scale production (approximated by the prov-
ince’s average tax payment by taxpayer). As the authors compare two points in time before
and after the Spanish market integration, they conclude that market integration can be re-
garded as a trigger of the sharply increased agglomeration of economic activities. Kalemli-
Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha (1999) find higher population density, lower per capita gross do-
mestic product, lower population as well as a higher degree of risk sharing (supposed to rep-
resent financial market integration or development) to have a significant increasing impact on
the level of industrial specialisation of regions.
The presented theoretical frameworks point to a number of centripetal forces such as market
potential, economies of scale or local demand which seem to be important determinants in the
explanation of the concentration of sectors across space. Transport or transaction costs play an
essential role as a centrifugal force according to the theory as well. In case of mobile capital,
transaction costs are largely determined by capital market integration and liberalisation. Both,
transaction costs and integration variables will capture effects of EU-integration on regional
development. The econometric investigations of concentration tendencies in production
mostly find some support for the traditional trade theory as well as the new economic geogra-4
phy approaches. Several important exogenous variables are evident. The concentration of in-
dustries across space appears to be determined by market size, human capital or labour inten-
sity, scale intensities, and intermediate goods intensities (or market linkages). In addition,
integration seems to have an increasing effect on sectoral concentration.
In this study, however, we focus on regional developments and the similarity of sectoral
structures of EU-regions. Hereby, we analyse the allocation of different industrial sectors
within a region and hence, to what extent a country or region is specialised sectorally. By this,
we do not explain why a region is especially strong or specialised in a particular sector (what
is in the focus of traditional trade theory). Instead, our attention is on the determinants of an
uneven allocation of relative investment shares within a region, i.e. level of relative regional
specialisation. As long as regional specialisation arises along with the concentration of sectors
across space, its level might equally be influenced by market size or the gravitational force of
the centre. In addition, the distance to the centre and integration or liberalisation impacts (ex-
tending potential markets and enforcing gravitational forces) seem to be relevant determi-
nants. Finally, a very important aspect to focus on when analysing regional investments is the
potential of economic growth within a region, e.g. number of patents and the regional eco-
nomic situation.
III    Empirical evidence: What determines the level of relative investment
specialisation in EU-regions?
As a measure of relative investment similarity, Gini-coefficients
2 are constructed like in the
studies of Krugman (1991), Brülhart (1998), Klüver and Rübel (1998), and Amiti (1999)
3. In
order to abstract from size and classification effects (i.e. the differing importance of sectors
and the possibly inadequate disaggregation of economic activity in subsectors), we do not
calculate the Gini-coefficient over absolute investment shares, but over relative ones, i.e. in-
vestment shares in relation to an economy of reference. This is important as the absolute allo-
cation of production across sectors does not tell anything about a particularly high level of
sectoral engagement of that region while this is what we focus on: relative allocation and
                                                
2 The Gini-coefficient is well known from the analysis of problems of distribution and is expressed as the ratio of
twice the area between the Lorenz curve and the 45°-line. The Lorenz curve is constructed by plotting the - in
ascending order - cumulated relative sectoral shares. The Gini-coefficient can be used to focus either on relative
or absolute similarity depending on the precise construction of industrial shares whose distribution is analysed
(see below). It gives strong weight to the middle parts of the distribution of relative sectoral shares. As a conse-
quence, changes in industrial sectors similar to the median structure have a larger effect on the value of the Gini-
coefficient than changes in industrial sectors at the outer sides of the distribution (Cowell, 1995). However, the
coefficient’s range between 0 (low concentration) and 1 (high concentration) usually reflects well differences in
the level of concentration. Therefore, the Gini-coefficient is the most widely used inequality measure in the
analysis of the spatial allocation of sectors or sectoral allocation of regional economic activity.
In addition to the calculation of the Gini-coefficient as a measure of the level of relative regional specialisation,
we also calculated the Finger-Kreinin-index as well as the coefficient of variation of the adapted Balassa-indices.
The latter stresses changes at the outer sides of the distribution of relative sectoral shares which is in contrast to
the weighting of the Gini-coefficient. A graphical comparison of all three indicators shows a similar develop-
ment over time, the main difference is a generally lower value of the coefficient of variation which, however,
does not influence its course. We therefore get similar results when using these alternative measures.
3 However, Sapir (1996) analysing absolute country specialisation with export data made use of the Herfindahl
index instead, Greenaway and Hine (1991) of the Finger-Kreinin index. Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha
(1999) used an adaptation of the Finger-Kreinin index which is based on variance-measuring and consistent with
their focus on risk-sharing. For a discussion of these measure and their more detailed presentation see Stirboeck
(2001).5
hence, the degree of relative specialisation. It is the unequal size of regions or sectors that
generally causes the difference between absolute and relative investment patterns
4.
The relative regional distribution of capital within EU-regions can, of course, be investigated
applying two different perspectives. First, it is possible to analyse the regional investment
structure in relation to the national one which would be a national perspective. Second, the
regional investment structure can be compared to the average EU structure, thus adopting a
European perspective. Both perspectives lead to slightly different patterns of specialisation.
We now focus on the European perspective as we aim at capturing potential impacts of EU
integration on regional specialisation
5. Relative investment indices have therefore been con-
structed to measure the sectoral investment share of the respective region in relation to the
average investment share of the sector in EU as a whole
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with I as investment and s (r) as the sectoral (regional) index. As a result, this adapted „Bal-
assa-index“ reflects the relative investment performance of a region in a sector. If the region’s
investment in one sector is relatively strong (low) compared to the other regions, the index is
higher (smaller) than 1.
Measuring the level of relative investment specialisation, the Gini-coefficient is calculated in
















It thus captures the degree of homogeneity of these relative investment performance indices
for the respective region
7. In case of very similar relative investment shares for the different
sectors (i.e. similar relations of the regional investment shares for all sectors to their respec-
tive average share in the reference economy), we get a Gini-coefficient close to zero repre-
senting a low level of relative investment specialisation. This Gini-coefficient ranges between
0 and (N-1)/N. A standardised Gini-coefficient G*N/(N-1), referred to as the Lorenz-
Münzner-coefficient, is used in the estimates.
                                                
4 While measures of absolute concentration are influenced by regional size and sectoral classification, measures
of relative concentration are influenced by the sectoral patterns of either the economy of reference or the average
pattern of the group of countries included. In case of a very special pattern of the reference economy, the relative
specialisation pattern of the economic entities analysed can be biased. Further details on the construction of
different relative and absolute concentration indices can be found in Stirboeck (2001) as well as Krieger-Boden
(1999).
5 Using the relative investment indices in the national perspective does not affect the regression outputs.
6 Up to 17 differentiated sectors – consistent to the industrial classification of Nace Rev. 1 - Nomenclature des
activités économiques dans les Communautés Européennes - are available in the REGIO database.
7 An alternative way of calculating the similarity of relative patterns by use of the Gini-coefficient was applied
by e.g. Krugman (1991) and Amiti (1999). According to their measure, the cumulative sums of sectoral shares of
the given regions are to be plotted against those of the reference economy ranked according to their relative
shares (i.e. the adapted Balassa-indices). Both sectoral structures (and not their relation) are thus directly com-
pared. In case of very equal sectoral structures, we also get a Gini-coefficient near zero. However, both sectoral
shares, the one of the respective region as well as the one of the reference economy, influence the value of the
Gini-coefficient. If a large sectoral share in e.g. the reference economy is confronted with an even larger sectoral
share in the region in focus, the value of the Gini-coefficient is largely determined by this economically impor-
tant sector. This effect influences the value of the level of relative specialisation for some regions. Regression
results for this kind of indicator, however, do only slightly change.6
III. 1    Descriptive features of the similarity of relative gross fixed capital forma-
tion in EU-regions
The maximum number of regions included at the NUTS 2-level is 56 while it is 33 at the
NUTS 1-level
8. These regions belong to Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, Ireland,
Italy as well as Great Britain (only NUTS 1). Details are given in the appendix. For all other
countries, the sectoral data availability is not sufficient for our kind of analysis. The disaggre-
gation of EU countries into NUTS-regions is primarily based on political or administrative
entities. Such “normative” regions are regarded for practical reasons of data availability in the
REGIO database but also in accordance with the implementation of regional policies
9. These
regions are not grouped together on the basis of economic criteria. This is often criticised by
economists as this might not give us the actual degree of specialisation of economic entities.
However, the definition of economic regions might differ for each variable or even sector
regarded, i.e. a general specification of regional disaggregation is inappropriate. In addition,
the analysis of normative regions disaggregated according to NUTS allows us to focus on the
degree of specialisation of a territorial community which is authorised to implement regional
policies or is in the focus of regional structural programmes. As the debate about how spe-
cialised EU’s regions are originates in the question about their regional shock absorbing po-
tential and the necessity of improving regional policies, the analysis of administrative regional
entities is one relevant empirical aspect.
Table A4 presents average relative Gini-coefficients for all regions for the time period 1985 to
1994 as far as data has been available. One important feature that can be detected when ana-
lysing French, Italian, and Belgian regions (the only countries with available investment data
for both NUTS 1- and NUTS 2-levels) is the higher level of specialisation when regarding the
more disaggregated NUTS 2-regions in comparison to the NUTS 1-regions. Though this is
not surprising as relative sectoral dissimilarities are very likely to be aggregated away in big-
ger economic entities.
Further insights into the process of regional specialisation can be gained from a descriptive
comparison of the most “extreme” regions. Table A5 focuses on the two least and the two
most specialised NUTS 2-regions. With respect to GDP per capita, GFCF in percent of GDP,
and net migration
10, there are no systematic differences between the regions analysed. But
those regions with a more uniform relative allocation of investments across industrial sectors
are also marked by a higher number of patents, higher absolute GFCF as well as consequently
by higher absolute GDP. Higher specialised regions, however, seem to perform worse in eco-
nomic terms than lower specialised regions with respect to the unemployment rate, the share
of regional to total employment, the number of patents, and total regional GDP as well as total
regional GFCF. Exceptions though are a number of regions which are – in economic terms –
among the most important and which usually are located in the centre of the respective coun-
tries
11. As no causal relationship can be derived from this purely descriptive analysis,
econometric analyses are conducted in the following to test for significance and importance of
potential determinants.
                                                
8 As Ireland, Denmark and Luxembourg are monoregional countries at the NUTS 1- as well as the NUTS 2-
level, their relative concentration can only be calculated in relation to EU average sectoral shares. Otherwise, the
specialisation indices would all be 1 per definition, and the concentration indices thus 0.
9 Since the 1961 Brussels Conference on Regional Economies, regional policies are generally applicated in
NUTS 2-regions (Eurostat, 1999).
10 Here, only data since 1997 is available.
11 This effect becomes even more obvious when regarding Bruxelles and the Île de France at the NUTS 1-level.7
III. 2     Econometric evidence on the level of relative investment specialisation
As presented above, a number of determinants from different theoretical approaches are sup-
posed to explain the level of regional specialisation of gross fixed capital formation. However,
explanatory variables added in this analysis are to some extent limited by the data availability.
Including the core variables mentioned above, we test the following specification:
GCCFEUi =  β0 + β1MARi + β2AREAi + β3PATi + β4PODENi + β5UEWPi + β6CENTRi
+ β7INTi + β8ZENTRREGi
The market size (MAR) of region i is approximated by gross domestic product (GDP)
12. Ad-
ditional important exogenous variables are the size of a region (AREA), the number of patents
(PAT), population density (PODEN), unemployment rate in percent of working population
(UEWP) which are all taken from the REGIO database. The distance of the region to the eco-
nomic centre (CENTR) capturing effects of peripheral
 location
13, variables representing Euro-
pean integration (INT), i.e. economic openness and capital account liberalisation indices, as
well as an indicator variable for central, economically most important regions (ZENTRREG)
are added. Details on all these variables are given in the data appendix. Unfortunately, data on
patent applications has not been available for Corse and Northern Ireland. As a consequence,
these two regions are dropped in the estimations when using patents as explanatory variables.
In addition, data on patents are only available since 1989. Separate estimations for the shorter
time period are therefore presented when patents turn out to be an important variable in panel
estimates.
The inclusion of the presented potential explanatory variables in the final estimation models
of the cross-sectional analysis has been determined by the result of a likelihood ratio (LR) test
at the 10%-level of significance
14. The decision between two different (non-nested) models
for the same period has been made in accordance with the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
We estimated variance-corrected standard errors by generalised least squares (GLS) to pre-
vent that potential heteroscedasticity influences the coefficients’ significance.
However, we cannot exclude from pure theory a potential problem of reverse causation be-
tween the level of investment specialisation and regional gross domestic product or the re-
gional rate of unemployment. In order to control for potential endogeneity problems, instru-
mental variable regressions have been conducted additionally for both GCCF and GCCFEU.
                                                
12 Further variables reflecting market size are the regional level of gross fixed capital formation, value added at
factor costs, total population, total employment as well as (aggregated) compensation of employees. Unsurpris-
ingly, these all turn out to be highly correlated with gross domestic product (see Table A6a and Table A6b in the
appendix). Due to this fact, only one of these variables can be included in the explanation of the strength of spe-
cialisation of gross fixed capital formation. Preference has hereby been accorded to the GDP variable (which is a
good proxy for market size). In most cases, the substitution of GDP by any of the other variables does change the
results only negligibly, i.e. the estimated coefficients and models are very robust. In some cases, the use of an-
other variable instead of GDP, e.g. population, would have improved the overall goodness of the estimation.
However, GDP was used in the estimations what did not lead to differing results.
13 In the analysis of sectoral agglomeration or concentration, distances are usually supposed to capture trade
costs. Up to a certain level, decreasing transport costs might strengthen agglomeration tendencies. But once
reaching this level, theory tells that dispersion factors (such as factor costs in the periphery) can be stronger. The
variable’s sign is thus not expected ex ante by theory. However, as we focus on regional aspects in this analysis,
the simplest and most consistent interpretation of the variable “distance to the economic centre” is that it cap-
tures the effect of being far away from the economically most important regions, i.e. the impacts of the periph-
eral location of a given region.
14 However, most coefficients as well as the LR tests on the inclusion of further variables are significant at the
5%- or even the 1%-level of significance.8
Following one common approach in econometric analysis, lagged values of the unemploy-
ment rate as well as of gross domestic product are included as instruments. As a consequence,
results are very similar, and most coefficients are even nearly identical
15.
III. 2.1   Cross-sectional analyses
Cross-sectional analyses are conducted at the NUTS 2- as well as the more aggregated NUTS
1-level. Results for the NUTS 2-level are displayed in Table 1. The higher gross domestic
product and the bigger the size of the region, the more similar relative sectoral shares of gross
fixed capital formation turn out to be. In contrast, an increase in the unemployment rate as
well as the fact of being a central (economically important) region increase the level of in-
vestment specialisation. In some years, population density seems to capture the effect usually
picked up by the indicator variable for the central region. Both variables therefore appear to
reflect a form of centrality effect. In some years, the number of patents shows a significant
increasing effect on the level of specialisation as well.
Only the interpretation of the empirical influence of the liberalisation indicator taken from
Quinn (1997, 2000)
16 is ambiguous as it shows first negative and, since 1990, positive signs.
Since these liberalisation indicators are not available at the regional level, but only at the
country level, they might pick up country-specific effects in cross-sectional analyses. Con-
trolling for this potential effect, country-specific dummies are added to the presented estima-
tions. These country dummies are relative to Italy as the Italian data is available for all sectors
and years. As a result, the liberalisation indicators indeed loose their significance in most
cases or are even dropped due to problems of high collinearity with the country dummies.
However, only for 1990, the equation including country-specific indicators is statistically
better according to the AIC and the likelihood ratio test result
17. In addition, the country-
specific dummies are – except for the Belgian dummy - rarely significant. This indicates that
on the one hand the effects captured by Quinn’s liberalisation indicator cannot be picked up
equally by country-specific dummies for the different years. On the other hand, we cannot
exclude that in these cross-section regressions the liberalisation indicator does not actually
measure additional effects or even other impacts. More reliable results will be gained in the
pooled regressions as the indicators’ variation over time is exploited.
Besides these inconclusive impacts of the liberalisation indicator, we find plausible and con-
sistent signs for all other coefficients for which significant results are demonstrable. In addi-
tion, these coefficients are very robust with respect to the estimation method (i.e. OLS, GLS,
IV estimates) as well as to changes in the estimated model or the substitution of gross domes-
tic product by one of the other variables proxying market size such as population. Only for the
years 1993 and 1994, the econometric results are not as reliable as in the other years. This is
due to the lower number of regions with available data - e.g. for all French regions data is
missing.
                                                
15 As data is only available for 1985 to 1994, instrumental variable cross-section analyses for 1985 had to be
omitted. For the same reason, only 30 out of 53 (56) observations can be included in the regressions for 1986 so
that the IV estimates cannot capture the same effects as the simple GLS regression. However, for all other years,
the same effects can be demonstrated as explained above.
16 This indicator differentiates between varying levels of liberalisation over time. Its construction is explained in
the appendix.
17 Results for the regressions including country dummies are available from the author upon request.9
Table 1: Cross-sectional analysis: Determinants of GCCFEU, NUTS 2-regions
year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
constant 2.2736 0.4643 0.4230 0.4238 0.4563 -0.0480 -1.2992 -0.9289 0.4454 0.4353
3.06 10.34 10.29 11.95 15.58 -0.32 -3.27 -1.73 13.9 11.23
gdp -0.0025 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0014 -0.0011
-4.44 -2.04 -2.02 -1.8 -2.81 -2.89 -2.91 -2.31 -3.78 -2.76
zentrreg 0.1891 0.1031 0.1210 0.0841 0.1281 0.1097 0.1861
3.7 2.22 2.8 1.97 3.23 2.58 3.6
uewp 0.0078 0.0085 0.0111 0.0093 0.0065 0.0057 0.0078 0.0105 0.0086 0.0081
2.21 2.26 3.23 3.28 2.46 1.97 2.96 2.71 3.23 2.82
poden 0.0489 0.0487 0.0517
2.73 3.65 3.35
area -0.0039 -0.0039 -0.0031 -0.0025
-3.92 -4.2 -3.38 -2.91
quinn_openn -0.1798 0.0375 0.1269 0.0989
-2.46 3.41 4.39 2.54
centr 0.1550
2.35
no. obs. 30 56 56 56 56 56 53 56 34 34
Prob Chi² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: Z-values of GLS-estimates are given in the line below the coefficients. The probability of the Chi²-test
gives the overall fit of the model. For abbreviations see Table A2 and A3 in the appendix.
Table 2: Cross-sectional analysis: Determinants of GCCFEU, NUTS 1-regions
year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
constant 1.2197 0.2591 0.3824 0.4627 0.4411 0.4402 0.4031 0.2310 0.4548 0.2947
4.55 5.99 12.67 17.99 20.33 21.86 10.38 6.43 12.34 6.36
gdp -0.0030 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0012
-5.38 -2.97 -2.52 -2.75 -2.85 -3.36 -2.83
zentrreg 0.2154 0.0784 0.1297 0.0678 0.0788 0.1290 0.2184 0.0904
4.24 2.05 3.22 1.84 2.36 4.42 5.78 2.61
uewp 0.0119 0.0050 0.0163 0.0073
3.34 1.7 4.82 2.73
poden 0.0310 0.0361 0.0345 0.0589 0.0625 0.0757









no. obs. 22 33 33 33 33 33 30 33 25 17
Prob Chi² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0124 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Note: see Table 1.
Changing our focus from NUTS 2- to the more aggregated NUTS 1-level, results – displayed
in Table 2 – are very similar
18. Gross domestic product and the unemployment rate prove to
have a significant impact on the level of GCCFEU in many years. Central or core regions still
show a higher level of relative investment specialisation at NUTS 2-level while population
                                                
18 Again, instrumental variables estimations have been conducted by use of the lagged unemployment rate and
the lagged gross domestic product variable as instruments. Like for the NUTS 2-level, results have been very
similar to the simple GLS regressions at the NUTS 1-level.10
density now demonstrates a joint increasing effect on specialisation in many years. However,
if both variables are jointly significant, the size of both coefficients is consistently lower.
Only the size of the region does not show a significant and consistent influence at this aggre-
gation level. As NUTS 1-regions are higher aggregated and usually consist of a number of
NUTS 2-regions, their size differs much less. In addition, bigger regions are naturally more
diversified, so this result is not surprising.
Only in 1986 and 1992, the estimations significantly improve according to the AIC and the
LR test results when adding country-specific variables. Ireland, Denmark, and Luxembourg
prove to have significant country dummies in some years as well. However, their significance
is rather inconsistent over time. The inclusion of country dummies therefore does not really
improve estimates at NUTS 1-level. Analogously, the Quinn liberalisation indicator is also
not significant any more – besides of the year 1985. This might be the result of the decreased
number of regions included at NUTS 1-level and therefore even lower variation of the open-
ness indicator. When adding country-specific dummies, the Quinn-indicator of openness of
1985 still remains significant while the country dummies do not improve the estimation.
III. 2.2   Pooled estimates and panel data analyses
In the following, a number of results for pooled data and panel estimations are presented.
Pooled data estimates, given in Table 3, display results very similar to those of the cross-
section analyses. Since regressions including patents as explanatory variables only start in
1989 (due to the data availability), two regression models are displayed for the two different
time periods when relevant. However, all regressions are robust as the coefficients for the
other exogenous variables do hardly change. And – like in the cross-sectional estimates – the
instrumental variable estimations – displayed in Table A8
19 - lead to extremely similar results.
Again, higher gross domestic product and a bigger size of a region diminish the level of spe-
cialisation of this region while a higher unemployment rate, population density
20 and the fact
of being a central region increase its level. The influence of the distance to this central region
on the level of specialisation is positive as well. The more peripheral a region is, the less
similar is its sectoral structure to the average structure of the EU.
This time, the inclusion of country-specific effects, again relative to Italy, generally improves
the estimates according to the AIC and LR tests. All country-specific indicator variables are
generally significant. Besides the Belgian regions, which are marked by a significantly higher
level of specialisation than the Italian regions, all other regions have a significantly lower
level of specialisation. But we cannot be sure that the significant positive fixed country effect
for Belgium is due to country-specific characteristics. However, this dummy might also cap-
ture the poor quality of the Belgian data. In contrast to fixed country effects, fixed time effects
estimated relative to 1994 never improve the estimates.
We are now, finally, aware of a consistent positive impact of liberalisation on the level of
specialisation. The Quinn openness indicator is not only significant in most of the pooled re-
gressions, it also remains significant in the improved estimates including country-specific
                                                
19 In this table, we display the results for the first lag of GDP and UEWP used as instruments. We also tested for
robustness by using GDP and UEWP lagged two periods. However, the results did hardly change.
20 The coefficient for population density, however, changes its sign in the estimates at NUTS 2-level when in-
cluding country-specific dummies. Running separate estimates for either population density or the central region
dummy, we get positive signs again.11
dummies. Again, we get no differing results when conducting instrumental-variable regres-
sions to exclude potential problems of endogeneity (see Table A8).
Table 3: Panel estimates, pooled regressions: Determinants of GCCFEU
NUTS 2 NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 1
1985-94 1989-94 1985-94 1985-94 1989-94 1985-94
constant 0.3453 0.3112 0.2734 0.3687 0.2593 0.2778 constant 0.3696 0.0604 0.3790
9.57 8.6 4.5 6.25 6.35 6.75 3.51 0.47 3.95
gdp -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0015 -0.0020 -0.0004 -0.0005 gdp -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0004
-7.14 -7.38 -5.01 -6.04 -4.16 -3.8 -7.16 -5.28 -4.25
zentrreg 0.1216 0.2342 0.0849 0.1856 0.1013 0.1558 zentrreg 0.1217 0.0790 0.1020
6 . 5 8 8 . 54 . 0 85 . 8 17 . 0 26 . 8 3 6 . 5 73 . 7 87 . 0 8
uewp 0.0087 0.0075 0.0085 0.0075 0.0072 0.0067 uewp 0.0088 0.0085 0.0074
8.54 7.66 6.58 6.37 6.73 5.67 8.47 6.57 6.87
poden 0.0136 -0.0134 0.0267 0.0017 0.0359 0.0321 poden 0.0135 0.0277 0.0355
2 . 3 - 23 . 5 80 . 2 18 . 0 65 . 2 3 2 . 2 83 . 7 48 . 0 0
area -0.0032 -0.0021 -0.0017 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 area -0.0032 -0.0015 -0.0003
-8.76 -3.94 -3.66 0.29 -1.85 1.06 -8.63 -3.12 -2.00
quinn_openn 0.0072 0.0068 0.0130 0.0058 0.0063 0.0062 quinn_openn 0.0051 0.0274 -0.0029
2.6 2.63 2.88 1.36 1.97 2 0.69 3.05 -0.44
pat 0.0001 0.0002 pat 0.0001
2.77 3.8 3.09
centr 0.0513 0.1237 0.0606 0.0356 centr 0.0517 0.0615
3.00 6.66 3.03 1.68 3.02 3.09
dum_fra -0.0208 -0.0681 -0.0506 year_1985 0.0156 -0.0313
-1.99 -4.25 -3.57 0.44 -1.00
dum_bel 0.0920 0.0539 -0.0430 year_1986 -0.0013 -0.0287
6.6 3.49 -2.35 -0.04 -0.97
dum_ire -0.0504 -0.1136 -0.0967 year_1987 -0.0086 -0.0291
-0.97 -1.75 -2.78 -0.27 -0.98
dum_lux -0.1970 -0.2613 -0.0927 year_1988 -0.0142 -0.0167
-4.82 -5.32 -2.56 -0.48 -0.60
dum_den -0.1249 -0.1654 -0.1485 year_1989 -0.0004 0.0612 -0.0081
-3.02 -3.31 -4.77 -0.01 1.90 -0.29
dum_ukd -- -- -0.0011 year_1990 0.0031 0.0239 0.0001
-0.10 0.14 1.09 0.00
year_1991 -0.0083 0.0022 -0.0014
-0.41 0.11 -0.06
year_1992 0.0190 0.0269 0.0090
0.94 1.36 0.42
year_1993 0.0068 0.0119 0.0134
0.31 0.47 0.60
no. obs. 487 487 282 282 292 292 no. obs. 487 282 292
SSR 3.9500 3.3305 2.1533 1.6841 1.4399 1.2745 SSR 3.9062 2.1079 1.4157
Log Likeli 481.32 522.86 287.22 321.87 361.25 379.06 Log Likeli 484.03 290.23 363.72
Prob Chi² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Prob Chi² 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
AIC -1.944 -2.094 -1.98 -2.191 -2.42 -2.5 AIC -1.918 -1.966 -2.375
Note: see Table 1.
In contrast to the cross-section estimates presented above, time correlation effects might be of
importance in panel data. This means that autocorrelation of the residuals cannot be excluded
a priori. In order to take account of these potential effects, the lagged endogenous variable is
included in the estimates to capture possible first-order serial correlation effects. The use of
other, more sophisticated specifications of dynamic adjustments is possible
21. However, the
methodological discussion about the optimal dynamic specification in the econometric analy-
sis of panel data is still ongoing. We therefore only include the endogenous variable lagged
one period when checking the robustness of the above presented results. In the estimates with
country fixed effects presented in Table A8, almost all coefficients remain significant and
                                                
21 See Baltagi (1995) for an account of this issue.12
their sign unchanged
22 – only the population density as well as the regional size variable loose
their explanatory power. However, the empirical impact of the variables identified so far is
mostly confirmed.
Throughout all regressions, the predicted values were in the range between 0 and 1, so that
our restricted endogenous variable did not impose an econometric modelling problem. The
use of a logistic transformation of the regression specification – limiting the range of y to lie
in the interval 0,1 – is a more sophisticated procedure, but does not change our results as none
of the predicted values lies at the outer sides of the given range. The results for additional
pooled regressions in logit terms are presented in the appendix Table A8.
Table 4: Panel estimations: Determinants of investment specialisation
N u t s  2N u t s  1N u t s  2N u t s  1
WE WE BE BE
constant 0 . 6 3 7 60 . 6 5 5 10 . 4 2 8 90 . 3 2 0 3
8.64 7.20 13.1 8.43






poden -0.5514 -0.6475 0.1200 0.0375




no. obs. 487 292 487 292
no. groups 56 33 56 33
R² within 0 . 0 1 2 10 . 0 3 9 70 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 1 2 2
R² between 0 . 1 0 2 60 . 3 5 1 80 . 4 3 7 10 . 6 5 4 3
R² overall 0 . 0 8 8 60 . 2 9 2 40 . 3 4 9 20 . 5 0 4 8
Prob F 0 . 0 2 2 50 . 0 0 5 50 . 0 0 0 00 . 0 0 0 0
Note:  T-values are given in the line below the coefficients. For abbreviations, see Table A2 and A3 in
the appendix. WE stands for fixed effects (within) estimates and BE for between estimates.
In order to further exploit the time and cross-sectional structure of the data and to check for
robustness of our results, fixed effects (within) estimates and between estimates are conducted
additionally
23. Fixed effects estimates control for region-specific differences by adding a spe-
cific constant for each region
24. Within estimates (“WE”) explain the deviation of the regional
observations from their respective group (regional) means, thereby excluding all region-
specific determinants from these fixed effects estimates. Within estimates thus provide us
with further insights on the variation within the groups (in our case within the regions). Be-
                                                
22 The size of the exogenous variables‘ coefficients naturally changes due to the dynamic relation specification of
the relationship. We have excluded the British regions from the dynamic specification for NUTS 1-regions. The
quality of the British regional data is rather low since many sectors are missing. This does not disturb our results
for pooled estimates, but for the dynamic specification.
23 First-difference estimates – explaining the change in the level of specialisation – are conducted additionally,
but are not convincing neither at the NUTS 2- nor at the NUTS 1-level. This might largely be due to the fact that
many of the explanatory variables are simply eliminated by the construction of the first difference. This is the
case for the indicator variable for central regions, but also for the only slightly varying variables such as the size
of a region, the degree of liberalisation, population density as well as the distance to the economic centre of the
respective country.
24 Using this approach, we have to omit the overall constant.13
tween effects (“BE”), in contrast, explain the variation between the different groups only fo-
cusing on the groups’ means and on region-specific characteristics
25.
By means of fixed effects within estimates, only few significant impacts can be detected. For
the panel of all NUTS 2- (NUTS 1-)regions, only population density consistently proves to be
a relevant exogenous variable in explaining the variation of the level of regional specialisation
over time. Since the variation of population density over time within a region is of minor ex-
tent, this effect is not really convincing. All in all, the within-estimates do not contribute to
the explanation of regional specialisation patterns within the groups.
In additional fixed effects estimates with explicit region-specific constants, we find that the
region-specific constants are generally significant at the 1%-level and turn out to be the most
important determinants in the explanation of the specialisation levels. The region-specific
constants’ levels differ largely in these estimations. The one of Bruxelles-capital is the high-
est, at a large distance to even the second largest regional constant. We find all regional con-
stants to be significant for the specification at the NUTS 2-level. However, the fixed effects
estimates at NUTS 1-level strongly improve when excluding the population density variable
from the specification. And again, we find the fixed regional effects to be the only dominant
impact on specialisation in these estimates. Though we have a – sometimes not negligible –
variation of the specialisation level of one region over time, this variation can only be ex-
plained by the presented estimates to a minor extent. The change in the level of specialisation
of one region over time might therefore not underlie systematic changes but rather be the re-
sult of random disturbances
26.
In contrast to the rather low explanatory power of these within estimates are the results of
between effects estimates (“BE”) which explain the variation of the level of specialisation
between regions. The results are very similar to those of the cross-sectional and the pooled
regressions presented above. Gross domestic product, regional size, the unemployment rate,
population density, the indicator variable for the central region as well as the distance to the
economic centre of the respective country again have significant explanatory power. In addi-
tion, the coefficients are of the same sign and about the same size as in the other regressions.
All explanatory variables are consistently significant in pooled and between estimates and are
of strong importance in the explanation of systematic differences in the specialisation levels.
The variation over time, though, is not explained by our regressions. It is now evident that
regional characteristics determine the respective level of specialisation while the variation
within a region over time cannot be found to be of systematic nature.
III.2.3 Spatial  econometric  estimates
Regional data, due to its spatial nature, potentially underlies spatial dependence or interaction.
Standard regressions do not account for spatial dependence or autocorrelation thus leading to
inefficient or even biased estimates in case of significant spatial processes. In addition to sim-
ple OLS estimates presented so far, we therefore refer to models of spatial econometrics in
this section, which explicitly take account of spatial interaction (see e.g. Anselin, 1988). The
                                                
25 For further details on panel data analyses, see e.g. Baltagi (1995).
26 It is also possible that measurement errors as well as the changing number of available sectors have some
influence on the variation of the level of regional concentration over time which then naturally cannot be ex-
plained by economic determinants.14
structure of spatial interconnectedness is usually given or rather imposed by so-called spatial
weights matrices (W).
A number of different spatial econometric models – as well as combinations of those
27 – can
be formulated. In a spatial autoregressive error model, 
28 captures  the spatial autoregression
of the error term  while u is an independently and normally distributed error term with con-
stant variance:
Y = X +  ,        =  W  + u ,
u ~ N (0, ²u I) .
In a spatial lag model,  is the spatial autoregressive parameter which measures the reaction
of Y to surrounding economic developments, i.e. spatial spillovers or the influence exerted by
the neighbouring regions on the level of specialisation in region i:
Y = WyY + X + u ,       u ~ N (0, ²u I) .
In addition to spatially interdependent endogenous variables, neighbouring regions might be
affected by spatially interdependent exogenous variables, thus giving rise to a regressive spa-
tial model with spatially lagged explanatory variables:
Y = X11 + WxX22 + u ,    u ~ N (0, ²u I) .
A model specification with spatially lagged explanatory variables only can be estimated by
simple OLS estimates
29. However, to prevent inefficient or even biased estimates in case of
spatial lag or error dependence, we have to refer to different estimation methods. A standard
technique to deal with spatial lag dependence or spatial autoregressive error terms is to con-
duct Maximum-Likelihood (ML)-estimates
30.
The standard software (SpaceStat1.90) for this kind of analysis does not capture time-space-
models
31, while the simple dynamic relationship we estimated provided evidence for signifi-
cant serial first-order correlation. However, the dynamic specification also confirmed our re-
sults for the main determinants of the level of regional specialisation – with the exception of
population density and regional size. Due to this, we now limit our estimations to pure space
                                                
27 In addition to spatial error models with a spatial autoregressive error term, the disturbance term can also fol-
low a spatial moving-average process. For a discussion of different first- or higher order spatial processes com-
bining spatial autoregressive dependent variables or error terms, spatial moving-average error terms as well as
spatially lagged external variables in such called “SARMA”- or “SARMAX”-models, see e.g. Anselin/Bera
(1998: 251f).
28 In spatial processes, the spatial autoregressive parameters are not restricted to the usual interval –1, +1. The
parameter space is instead restricted by 1/ωmin and 1/ωmax with 1/ωmin and 1/ωmax as the smallest and largest ei-
genvalues of the spatial weights matrix implemented in the regression (Anselin, 2001: 321). Thus, the spatial
autoregressive parameter can be smaller than –1.
29 See e.g. Haining (1990: 344-50). A problem of multicollinearity (between X and WX), however, arises in case
of spatially autocorrelated external variables. In this case, estimated parameters have to be interpreted carefully.
30 While OLS provides biased estimates in case of spatial lag dependence, it leads to unbiased, but inefficient
estimates in case of spatial autocorrelation of the error terms. Since the autocorrelation parameter  is unknown,
we cannot simply conduct weighted least squares estimates, however, and have to refer to maximum-likelihood
estimates as well. For further details on this topic, see e.g. Anselin (1988, 1999a).
31 The implementation of simultaneous time-space effects would have high computational costs and be rather
complicated. In the past, different solutions to this problem have been suggested. Schulze (1982) e.g. uses a four-
step-Aitken procedure with, first, the elimination of serial correlation and, second, the modelling of spatial de-
pendence.15
models. Since the tests on spatial dependence require a normal distribution in the errors of the
models estimated, we use restricted datasets so that the non-normality of errors can be re-
jected for each model presented in the following. We therefore eliminated outlying observa-
tions to achieve a normal distribution of the error terms
32.
In order to prevent that our findings are due to the formulation of spatial dependence imposed
by the spatial weights matrix, we test the sensitivity of our results with respect to different
weights matrices
33. First, we include two inverse distance matrices and, second, a neighbour-
hood contiguity matrix. The distance matrices are based on Euclidean distances between ad-
ministrative centres of the regarded regions as well as between regional centres as provided
by the ArcView software. We use the squared inverse of both distance matrices which thus
reflects a decreasing intensity of influence of nearby regions with increasing distance. As-
suming such a decreasing influence is economically more plausible than a constant strength of
interaction
34 as two neighbouring regions can be expected to have stronger interactions than
two regions at a high distance from each other. In addition, we use a neighbourhood contigu-
ity matrix, with the element wij = 1 in case of a common border of the regions i and j, and 0
otherwise, while the diagonal is set to 0.
Graph 1: Moran Scatterplot for NUTS2-regions, average level of relative specialisa-







































































Note: Standardised z_scores of GCCFEU assure the interregional comparability.
The Moran scatterplot given in Graph 1 displays the spatial association between the 56 re-
gions (Anselin, 1996) with respect to their average level of specialisation and the weighted
average of the neighbouring values. The levels of specialisation are taken as deviations from
their means, the scatterplot is thus centred around 0,0. In the upper right and the lower left
quadrant, those regions are displayed which are surrounded by similarly specialised regions
                                                
32 Tests on normality of errors are based on skewness tests as well as Kiefer-Salmon tests – both are applied in
such a way that the non-normality of errors cannot even be assumed at the 10% level of significance. By this, we
can conclude on a normal distribution of the residuals.
33 However, a common procedure is also to test a variety of slightly differing distance matrices in order to find
the spatial weights matrix that best fits to the underlying process of spatial dependence like e.g. in Molho (1995)
or Niebuhr (2001).
34 We additionally tested for the potential influence of inverse distance matrices with constant influence. In many
cases, we got similar results, though the estimates’ fit was generally not as good as the one for the preferred
weights matrices capturing a decreasing influence of neighbourhood economic activity.16
and are thus marked by positive spatial association. Regions with dissembling neighbours are
located in the upper left (regions with low specialisation surrounded by highly specialised
regions) and the lower right quadrants (vice versa). Using the weights matrix of the squared
inverse distances of regional capitals we find four outlying regions
35: Brussels, Namur, Lux-
embourg (Belgium) and Basse-Normandie all with a strongly uneven allocation of relative
investment shares. The two former, however, are surrounded by similarly specialised regions
while the two latter are surrounded by dissimilar regions.
The degree of linear association between the vectors y and Wy is formally indicated by the
Moran I statistic
36. The Moran I coefficient is centred around its theoretical expected mean
which is -1/(N-1). Values larger than its expected mean (-0.002 in our case of 469 observa-
tions
37) display positive spatial autocorrelation. The local Moran coefficient points to a sig-
nificant positive spatial autocorrelation of the level of specialisation, i.e. regions with similar
levels of specialisation are more spatially clustered than in the case of random patterns. In
other words, regions with a high (low) level of specialisation are more likely to be surrounded
by highly (low) specialised regions. For the two squared inverse distance matrices, the
significant local Moran I-value is 0.1077 (distance between regional capitals) and 0.1158
(distance between regional centres) and it is even higher – 0.2000 – for the neighbourhood-
contiguity matrix. However, from this kind of analysis, we only get information about spatial
associations, i.e. the spatial clustering of similar or dissimilar regions. Evidence on spatial
dependencies or even causal interactions have to be derived from spatial regression analyses.
Table 5: Diagnostics on Spatial Dependence, OLS-estimates
 ID10K_2  ID10Z_2 NGH_NVDU 
Moran's I (error) -5.2009 *** -2.7259 *** 0.2113
Lagrange Multiplier (error) 14.6786 *** 5.7395 *** 0.1976
Robust LM (error) 2.9375 * 1.0681 0.0047
Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 25.5496 *** 13.3197 *** 3.8984 **
Robust LM (lag) 13.8085 *** 8.6483 *** 3.7055 *
Note: Spatial weights matrices are defined as follows: ID10K_2: squared inverse of distance between regi-
onal capitals; ID10Z_2: squared inverse of distance between regional centres; NGH_NVDU: neigh-
bourhood contiguity matrix with the element wij = 1 in case of a common border of the regions i and j, and
0 otherwise.
Table 5 displays the diagnostics on the potential spatial structure to be found in the distur-
bance terms of simple OLS-estimates. Evidence on the spatial dependence of the residual of
simple OLS estimates is provided by a number of tests. It is stronger for the squared inverse
distance matrices than for the neighbourhood matrix what is not confirmed in the spatial esti-
mates presented below. The Moran I test (an extended version of the local Moran test pre-
sented above
38) provides evidence for a negative spatial autocorrelation of the residuals as the
two significant Moran I values are smaller than its expected value of –0.002.
The significant spatial structure in the residuals, indeed provides evidence that the GLS-
estimates presented above suffer from a misspecification. Our aim is now to investigate these
effects in more detail in order to check for robustness of the determinants and efficiency of
                                                
35 Outliers are defined as being “extreme with respect to the central tendency reflected by the regression slope”,
i.e., “they do not follow the same process of spatial dependence as the bulk of the other observations” (Anselin,
1996: 117). The SpaceStat software identifies them as those values larger (smaller) than the third (first) quartile
plus (minus) 1.5 times the interquartile range. In the standardised Moran scatterplot, these are the values further
than two units away from the origin (Anselin, 1995: 45).
36 For further details see Anselin (1996: 115ff) and Anselin (1992: 132f).
37 We now refer to the 469 observations of the restricted dataset which lead to normally distributed residuals in
the OLS-estimates of the given specification.
38 For further details, see Anselin and Bera (1998: 265ff).17
the coefficient tests identified in the classical econometric estimates. In all cases, the La-
grange Multiplier (LM)-error test suggested by Burridge (1980) has a lower probability value
than the LM-lag-test suggested by Anselin (1988), thus pointing to a model of spatial lag de-
pendence rather than of spatial error dependence. The robust LM-lag and LM-error tests
39 are
supposed to be more “suitable for the identification of the source of dependence” (Anselin et
al. 1996: 77). In the analysis of our Gini-coefficient, they clearly point to a spatial lag model.
With respect to the spatial lag specification, we get a significant spatial lag differing between
–0.07 and –0.60 for the three weights matrices. Thus, we find a significant impact of the level
of specialisation in nearby regions. The high level of specialisation in the neighbouring re-
gions significantly reduces specialisation in the region in focus. Therefore, we are confronted
with a significant negative spatial interaction of the level of regional specialisation. Regarding
the other explanatory variables, the model’s results coincide with the above found results.
While the LR-tests confirm the spatial lag dependence, the test diagnostics for further spatial
error dependence do not provide any further spatial structure.
Table 6: Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of Spatial Lag Models (469 observations)
VARIABLE \ weights matrix ID10K_2 z-value ID10Z_2 z-value NGH_ND z-value
W_GCCFEU -0.5964 -4.46 -0.3097 -2.80 -0.0652 -1.79
CONSTANT 0.5157 8.06 0.4017 7.10 0.3076 8.36
GDP -0.0008 -7.43 -0.0008 -7.89 -0.0008 -8.10
ZENTRREG 0.2117 9.61 0.2213 10.03 0.2198 9.69
UEWP 0.0107 11.91 0.0092 10.86 0.0078 9.82
PODENNEU -0.0091 -1.73 -0.0107 -1.98 -0.0076 -1.40
AREA -0.0018 -4.41 -0.0018 -4.20 -0.0017 -4.10
QUINN_OP 0.0087 4.23 0.0086 4.12 0.0083 3.91
CENTR 0.1200 8.15 0.1251 8.35 0.1152 6.15
DUM_FRA -0.0381 -4.61 -0.0372 -4.42 -0.0331 -3.93
DUM_BEL 0.1279 9.14 0.1123 8.16 0.0897 7.76
DUM_IRE -0.0562 -1.38 -0.0607 -1.48 -0.0835 -1.93
DUM_LUX -0.0775 -2.21 -0.1368 -4.04 -0.1685 -5.18
DUM_DEN -0.1081 -3.27 -0.1208 -3.65 -0.1558 -4.34
Breusch-Pagan test 98.1411 *** 99.1209 *** 98.80191 ***
LR-Test on spatial lag dependence 23.7133 *** 10.2056 *** 3.5954 *
LM-Test on spatial error dependence 0.0065 1.4692 1.278618
LIK 621.39 614.64 611.34
AIC -1214.79 -1201.28 -1194.67
SC -1156.68 -1143.17 -1136.56
Note: For spatial weights matrices see Table 5.
ML-estimates of the spatial error specification are presented in Table 7. Again, we find a
negative spatial correlation which is displayed in the negative autocorrelation coefficient of
the error terms
40. Neglecting the population density variable, all our determinants are robust
like in the spatial lag specification. Except for the estimates referring to the neighbourhood
contiguity matrix, the LR-tests on spatial error correlation confirm the spatial autoregressive
error dependence and the tests on further spatial lag dependence are not significant
41. The
                                                
39 The robust LM-tests are modifications controlling for a joint significance of both, spatial lag and error depend-
ence, developed by Bera and Yoon (1993) and are discussed in detail in Anselin et al. (1996).
40 As explained above, the spatial error correlation coefficient is restricted to the range between 1/ωmin and
1/ωmax. Using id10k_2, the minimal spatial error correlation coefficient is thus –1.654, in case of id10z_2 it is
1.552 and of the neighbourhood contiguity matrix it is –1.405. For our three estimates, this condition is fulfilled.
41 However, the two tests on common factor hypothesis point to an “inherent inconsistency” of the spatial error
model. This might be caused by a further influence of spatially lagged explanatory variables (see Anselin, 1992:
212) which is worth being analysed in future research.18
results for the neighbourhood contiguity matrix, however, are in line with the spatial depend-
ence diagnostics obtained for the classical regressions which are given in Table 5.
Table 7: Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of Spatial Error Models (469 observations)
VARIABLE \ weights matrix ID10K_2 z-value ID10Z_2 z-value ngh_nvdu z-value
CONSTANT 0.2469 9.32 0.2563 9.24 0.2542 8.77
GDP -0.0008 -7.90 -0.0009 -8.71 -0.0009 -8.87
ZENTRREG 0.2280 10.42 0.2377 10.48 0.2413 10.61
UEWP 0.0098 18.76 0.0091 15.47 0.0087 12.27
PODEN -0.0015 -0.26 -0.0133 -2.39 -0.0113 -2.06
AREA -0.0007 -1.75 -0.0011 -2.61 -0.0013 -3.02
QUINN_OP 0.0078 3.92 0.0088 4.22 0.0088 4.16
CENTR 0.1162 9.82 0.1157 9.01 0.1298 9.18
DUM_FRA -0.0372 -6.11 -0.0382 -5.59 -0.0323 -4.39
DUM_BEL 0.0824 9.42 0.0872 9.45 0.0915 8.92
DUM_IRE -0.1302 -3.39 -0.1174 -2.90 -0.1008 -2.45
DUM_LUX -0.0488 -1.67 -0.1330 -4.03 -0.1653 -5.05
DUM_DEN -0.1701 -5.45 -0.1665 -5.10 -0.1496 -4.54
LAMBDA -1.4844 -13.60 -1.0209 -4.57 -0.3032 -1.58
Breusch-Pagan test 107.5154 *** 110.2553 *** 105.3065 ***
LR-Test on spatial error dependence 43.2261 *** 11.4204 *** 0.9424
LM-Test on spatial lag dependence 0.1409 1.6321 0.6174
LIK 631.15 615.25 610.01
AIC -1236.30 -1204.49 -1194.02
SC -1182.34 -1150.54 -1140.06
Note: For spatial weights matrices see Table 5.
Both spatial models (spatial lag as well as spatial autoregressive error dependence) generate
the same empirical relationships between the level of specialisation and the explanatory vari-
ables we found in the GLS-estimation results without taking account of spatial dependence
42.
In addition, both models appear to be a better specification than the GLS-model without spa-
tial dependence with an AIC of –1193.07 and a log likelihood of 609.54. However, both do
not solve the problem of heteroscedasticity. Comparing the two specifications, we consis-
tently get better (i.e. lower) information criteria for the spatial error specification. In contrast
to this stand the spatial dependence diagnostics of the OLS-estimates which all pointed to a
better specification of the spatial lag model.
IV Economic perspectives and effects of EU integration
The regression results we find in cross-sectional and pooled regression analyses as well as
between effects and spatial econometric estimates consistently point to a high importance of
market size, regional size, the location in the centre, the distance to the centre, and the popu-
lation density of a region as well as the unemployment rate and economic and capital market
integration in the explanation of relative regional investment specialisation. Our results on the
impacts of market size, the population density of a region and of capital market or economic
liberalisation on specialisation levels are in line with Kalemli-Ozcan, Sorensen and Yosha
(1999) who found lower population, higher population density and higher risk-sharing (as a
proxy for capital market integration) to increase regional specialisation of production. In ad-
                                                
42 Population density is insignificant in the GLS-estimates with the restricted dataset of 469 observations as well
as in some of the spatial dependence models. In case of significance, it displays a negative sign, what is not con-
sistent with most the different GLS-estimates.19
dition, we controlled for the effect of further economic variables, in particular the unemploy-
ment rate, the number of patents of a region as well as its distance from the centre.
Table 8: Impact of economic variables on the level of relative specialisation
Economic variable Sign of impact on GCCFEU
Gross domestic product -
Fact of being a central region +
Unemployment rate +
Population density +
Size if a region -
Economic openness +
Distance to economic centre +
Number of patents +
Market size reflects the economic as well as demand potential of a region. The better it is, the
more similar relative investment shares tend to be. However, this significant impact of market
size is in contrast to the increasing impact of market size on sectoral agglomeration consis-
tently found by Haaland et al. (1999) and Tirado, Paluzie and Pons (2000). While – according
to their results – firms tend to locate close to large markets, our empirical results show that
regions with a larger market seem to attract capital of all types of sectors with a more even
relative allocation (hence showing a lower level of relative regional specialisation) than
smaller markets. Economic activity in regions with a lower gross domestic product seems to
be specialised to a higher degree. However, the determinants of the location of particular
sectors across EU-regions is not subject of this study.
In addition to regions with a larger market size, regions with a bigger size tend to have a more
similar relative distribution of investments. But the significance of the regional size variable
might simply be due to the fact that bigger regions are logically more diversified in their pro-
duction structure than smaller regions. The fact that NUTS 1-regions are less varying in their
size as well as more evenly diversified than NUTS 2-regions leads to an insignificant size
variable at the NUTS 1-level. This demonstrates that it is very important to analyse equally
big regions. Thus preference has to be accorded to regions as small as possible to avoid that
aggregation cancels out potential specialisation patterns. Controlling for regional size effects
in the estimates is therefore essential.
In contrast to the fact that larger markets do not show a strong investment specialisation in
only few sectors is the result we find for a number of economically very important regions:
Central regions (and equally regions with a high population density) demonstrate a signifi-
cantly higher level of relative investment specialisation. This increasing effect counteracts the
decreasing impact of the large market size. But, the high importance of the centrality indicator
variable which captures an outstanding strong fixed effect for Brussels, Lazio, and the Île de
France is in line with polarisation theory and new economic geography which predict cumu-
lative causation and self-reinforcing agglomeration. Regions having once gained a particularly
high potential of market or factor access attract further firms. Supposedly, sectors with firms
underlying positive economies of scale or economies of localisation expand in the core.
In addition, the impact of the distance of a given region to its (economic) centre on the level
of specialisation is positive. This means that peripheral regions are more different from the
average EU structure than regions closer to the centre. Both, the high specialisation of core as
well as of peripheral regions is in line with new economic geography predictions. In contrast
to the specialisation of core regions, we expect the specialisation of peripheral regions to oc-20
cur in sectors with low economies of scale and possibly high labour-intensity. However, the
sectoral patterns of regional specialisation remain the subject of further research.
The impact of European integration on specialisation patterns is captured by the influence of
market liberalisation and openness. In this context, capital market integration which improves
the potential mobility of capital is especially important when regarding dissimilarities in the
allocation of relative investments. In addition to the direct measuring of the impacts of eco-
nomic openness presented above we therefore also tested for the influence of capital market
integration in the pooled estimates. This is displayed in Table A8. All explanatory coefficients
are in general very similar to the coefficients in the models with the openness indicator. The
correlation between both indicators is about 0.77 (0.68) for the regions at NUTS 2-level
(NUTS 1-level). The indicator of liberalisation of capital accounts ranges between 0.5 and 4
while the economic openness indicator goes up to 14 when perfect openness is reached. As a
consequence the coefficient of the capital account liberalisation indicator is higher than the
other coefficient in our estimates. However, we cannot conclude on a difference in the
strength of the indicators’ influence from this fact.
The results of our regressions clearly demonstrate an increasing impact of liberalisation on
investment specialisation, so that the perfect liberalisation and capital market integration
within EMU seem to further augment specialisation patterns. Instead of a stronger diversifi-
cation, European regions might end up with an increasingly different relative investment
structure in the process of market integration. If this effect continues, further liberalisation
would lead to a higher risk of asymmetric shocks. However, specialisation need not always be
negative even though production structures become less diversified. The specialisation in an
industrial sector providing a high growth potential might be an asset and improve the regional
competitiveness in spite of a highly asymmetric industrial structure.
The unemployment rate reflects negative economic performance of a region (not accounting
for migration effects etc.). The worse the economic performance is, the stronger the structural
dissimilarity to the average patterns of EU turns out to be in our empirical analyses. The num-
ber of patents of a region is significant in many estimations as well, though not in all. Its coef-
ficient is mostly positive, i.e. we have a first indication that a higher number of patents in-
creases relative regional specialisation as well. Possibly patents only attract investments of
very particular sectors as they play a strong role in many important, but not in all sectors.
The spatial econometric analyses largely confirm the described impacts of economic variables
on the regional level of specialisation while controlling for spatial interdependencies. Thus,
the determinants identified by classical econometric methods remain robust. In addition, the
regressions provide evidence of negative spatial interactions. While the OLS test diagnostics
on spatial dependence point to a spatial lag dependence, the information criteria indicate a
better performance of the spatial error model. In the spatial lag specification, we find a sig-
nificant negative spatial spillover between the regional levels of specialisation. Economically
more plausible, however, is the interpretation of the negatively spatially correlated error terms
as a nuisance term due to measurement errors. Data inconsistencies as well as incompatibili-
ties due to shortcomings of the regional databases or a poor fit of the units of observation with
actual economic regions can be the initial reason for such spatial nuisances in the data.
Further improvements of this study are possible. Regarding the econometric analysis, it is
possible to further elaborate the weights matrices and to ameliorate the model specification by
e.g. investigating spatially lagged external variables. In addition, our analysis only focuses on
the determinants of regional investment specialisation levels. We find some evidence for the
stronger specialisation of regions in the extreme localisations core and periphery. As men-21
tioned above, the analysis of sectoral patterns of relative specialisation is an important aspect
when focusing on regional specialisation to detect possible regional imbalances by e.g. core-
periphery patterns of the localisation of capital-intensive or growth-oriented sectors.
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Appendix
Data description
The regional disaggregation of the data is given according to the Nomenclature of Territorial
Units for Statistics (NUTS - Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques). The REGIO
database disaggregates data for the three aggregation levels NUTS 1, 2 and 3. However, data
for GFCF is not available further disaggregated than the NUTS 2-level. In addition, it is not
complete (with regard to the regional and/or the sectoral disaggregation – the latter needed for
the calculation of the specialisation indices). Data availability is sufficient for the seven
countries given below. Here, the UK does not provide data disaggregated further than NUTS
1-level. Luxembourg, Denmark as well as Ireland are only regarded as one single region at the
NUTS 1- as well as at the NUTS 2-level (=monoregional countries). The maximum number
of regions available is therefore 33 at the NUTS 1-level and 56 at the NUTS 2-level.
















Belgium 2 Provinces 3 11
France 2 Régions 8 22
Italy 2 Regioni 11 20
Denmark 1&2 - 1 1
Ireland 1&2 - 1 1
Luxembourg 1&2 - 1 1
Total number of regions 33 (+ 3 n.a.) 56
Note: Version of NUTS 1995. French oversea departments (DOM – départements
outre-mer) are not counted in total sums for France as well as for the EU.
Data is taken from the Eurostat REGIO Database (yearbooks up to 2000) which – for gross
fixed capital formation - comprises data for the years 1985 to 1994. All data included in the
analysis is based on ESA79.
Table A2: List of explanatory variables, REGIO Database
abbreviation variable unit
gfcf Gross Fixed Capital Formation Currency: Billions of ECU
totem Total Employment in 1000 persons
coe Compensation of employees Currency: Billions of ECU
vafp Gross value added at factor costs Currency: Billions of ECU
gdp Gross domestic product Currency: Billions of ECU
pat European R&D patent applications total number
uewp Total Unemployment rates in % OF WORKING POPULATION
pop Total annual average population in Mio. PERSONS 
poden Population density in 1000 INHABITANTS/KM2
In addition to the available national account data, a number of further variables has been used
in the econometric analysis. The distance to the centre (centr) captures peripheral effects. It is
measured by the optimal route distance between the regional capital and the centre of the re-
spective country. Centres are Paris, Rome, London and Brussels. The distance is defined to be
1 for Denmark, Luxembourg as well as Ireland, and it is equally 1 for the regions containing24
the capital of the respective country. Central and economically important regions (zentrreg)
in the analysis are Île de France (France), Brussels (Belgium), and Lazio (Italy).
Table A3: List of further explanatory variables
abbreviation variable unit
centr distance to centre, proxy for transport costs   metres
zentrreg regional dummy set for central region  0 or 1
quinn_openn indicator of openness per country 0-14 (variation by 0.5)
quinn_ca indicator of capital account liberalisation per country 0-4 (variation by 0.5)
Available indicators of liberalisation arising from official sources are mostly indicator vari-
ables being either 0 or 1. However, such indicator variables do not allow to differentiate the
varying levels of control or to capture a decreasing level of control over time. Measuring a
level of integration for each year is therefore a better solution from an econometric point of
view. Quinn (1997, 2000) has constructed such a yearly index of openness on the basis of
those restrictions published by the IMF since the 1950s. This index is scaled from 0 (highest
degree of restrictions) up to 14 (highest degree of liberalisation) and aggregates the different
indicators of liberalisation progress in seven specified fields (capital in – and outflows, im–
and exports of goods and of services as well as international conventions of liberalisation)
with a respective degree of liberalisation between 0.5 and 2.
Quinn weighs quantitative restrictions of imports for example the highest (i.e. he attributes the
lowest partial liberalisation index of 0 in case of full and 0.5 in case of partly quantitative re-
strictions), existence of laws requiring the approval of international transactions are scored 1,
taxes 1.5 and finally free trade 2. With regard to capital account liberalisation, Quinn attrib-
utes 0 in case of required approval for capital transactions which are rarely granted, 0.5 (1) in
case of occasional (frequent) approval and finally 1.5 in case of taxing measurements (without
the need of an official approval). A subindex of the overall liberalisation index is a financial
liberalisation indicator ranging on a score between 0 and 4 which is aggregated from restric-
tions of capital inward and outward flows in the way explained above. All named potential
indicators, however, are only available at country, not regional, level, which has to be taken
into account in econometric analysis. Detailed restrictions for Luxembourg are not available
as Luxembourg and Belgium are part of a common monetary union since the 1950s. In our
analysis the „Quinn-indicator“ for Luxembourg is therefore naturally set equal to the one of
Belgium.25
Table A4:  Investment specialisation levels in EU-regions in 1985 to 1994 in relation to EU as a whole
(Standardised Gini-coefficients/ 17 sectors)
France Italy Belgium United Kingdom
Basse-Normandie 0.672 Basilicata 0.607 Luxembourg (B) 0.725 Note: Sectoral availability is strongly 
Corse 0.596 Calabria 0.590 Bruxelles-capitale 0.719 varying in Belgium from 4 to 11 sectors.
Ile de France 0.475 Molise 0.579 Namur 0.691 However, mostly 11 sectors are 
Bretagne 0.474 Valle d'Aosta 0.572 Hainaut 0.563 included.
Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur 0.473 Sicilia 0.566 Brabant Wallon 0.538 Due to a change in sectoral availability 
Languedoc-Rousillon 0.454 Sardegna 0.562 Antwerpen 0.503 of British data (9 sectors prior to 1987,
Franche-Comté 0.454 Lazio 0.507 West-Vlaanderen 0.491 4 since 1988), results for the time 
Auvergne 0.446 Puglia 0.492 Liège 0.479 since 1988 are rather primarily and not
Poitou-Charentes 0.424 Umbria 0.485 Vlaams Brabant 0.466 directly comparable to prior years.
Haute-Normandie 0.410 Liguria 0.454 Limburg (B) 0.446 Data has not been available for three of
Limousin 0.406 Marche 0.443 Oost-Vlaanderen 0.441 the eleven NUTS 1-regions.
Champagne-Ardenne 0.405 Abruzzo 0.442
Aquitaine 0.400 Trentino-Alto Adige 0.439
Midi-Pyrénées 0.381 Campania 0.428 Monoregional countries 
Centre (F) 0.379 Friuli-Venezia Giulia 0.390 Denmark 0.380
Pays de la Loire 0.364 Emilia-Romagna 0.386 Ireland 0.513
Lorraine 0.334 Toscana 0.382 Luxembourg 0.432
Bourgogne 0.333 Veneto 0.375
Picardie 0.315 Piemonte 0.373
Rhône-Alpes 0.311 Lombardia 0.311
Alsace 0.310
Nord - Pas-de-Calais 0.303
Ile de France 0.475 Sicilia 0.566 Bruxelles-capitale 0.719 Yorkshire and the Humber 0.471
Méditerranée 0.445 Sardegna 0.562 Région Wallonne 0.439 Wales 0.449
Ouest 0.405 Lazio 0.507 Vlaams Gewest 0.271 West Midlands 0.441
Sud-Ouest 0.361 Sud 0.500 East Midlands 0.435
Bassin Parisien 0.327 Abruzzo-Molise  0.446 East Anglia 0.424
Centre-Est 0.316 Campania 0.428 Scotland 0.399
Nord - Pas-de-Calais 0.303 Emilia-Romagna 0.386 South West 0.390
Est (F) 0.289 Centro (I) 0.375 Northern Ireland 0.378
Nord Est 0.359 North n.a.
Nord Ovest 0.344 North West n.a.
Lombardia 0.311 South East n.a.
Nuts 2, 1986 to 1992 Nuts 2 Nuts 2
Nuts 1, 1985 to 1987 Nuts 1 Nuts 1 Nuts 1, 1986 to 199226
 Table A5: Characteristics of most/least specialised NUTS 2 regions – specialisation relative to EU structure
(average 1985-94 unless indicated in brackets)



































NUTS 2, Most specialised regions
Bruxelles-capitale   0.719   0.515 [85-92] 23.17           n.a. n.a. 71 18.0 10.82 0.1
Luxembourg (B)   0.725   0.542 [85-92] 12.57 n.a. n.a. 6  2.1   7.52 2.8
Basse-Normandie   0.672 [86-92]   0.410 [85-89] 13.15 4.247 [86-92] 24.22 59 2.5   9.87 0.4
Corsica   0.596 [86-92]   0.523 [85-89] 12.40 0.583 [86-92] 19.26 n.a. 0.4 11.18 3.1
Basilicata   0.607   0.648  8.62         1.462   28.0       1 0.9 16.67 3.1
Calabria   0.590   0.697  7.90         4.222 25.56       3 2.9 19.31 -3.2
NUTS 2, Least specialised regions
Limburg (B)   0.446   0.302 [85-92] 14.05 n.a.  n.a.      21   6.7 10.34   0
Oost-Vlaandern   0.441   0.397 [85-92] 14.06 n.a.  n.a. 71 12.0   6.67  1.5
Alsace   0.310 [86-92]   0.247 [85-90] 16.2        6.058 [86-92] 23.45    215   2.9   6.28  1.1
Nord-Pas-de-Calais   0.303 [86-92]   0.265 [85-89] 13.02        9.877 [86-92] 19.67    125   5.9 13.12 -3.9
Piemonte   0.373   0.367 15.48      12.865 19.12    306   8.4  7.08  2.8
Lombardia   0.311   0.373 17.55      27.849 17.90    806  17.2  4.97  3.9
Region including national capital
Ile de France   0.475 [86-92]   0.277 [85-89] 24.30 52.066 [86-92] 20.61   2232 22.6 8.29  -4.9
Lazio   0.507   0.359 15.18       16.626 21.24    147 9.3 9.75   5.2
South-East      n.a.      n.a. 15.08            n.a.  n.a.    779 33.8 7.86  25.027
Table A6a: Correlation matrix NUTS 1-level: multicollinear variables
gdp gfcf vafp pop totem coe
gdp 1
gfcf 0.9456 1
vafp 0.9984 0.9555 1
pop 0.8535 0.8267 0.8574 1
totem 0.9383 0.877 0.936 0.9496 1
coe 0.9826 0.9044 0.973 0.8456 0.9349 1
Table A6b: Correlation matrix NUTS 2-level: multicollinear variables
gdp gfcf vafp pop totem coe
gdp 1
gfcf 0.9039 1
vafp 0.9994 0.9027 1
pop 0.9118 0.8473 0.9138 1
totem 0.9667 0.8755 0.967 0.9726 1
coe 0.9936 0.9217 0.9906 0.9129 0.9652 1
Table A7a: Correlation matrix NUTS 1-level: explanatory variables
gccfeu gdp zentrreg quinn_openn uewp poden centr
gccfeu 1
gdp -0.3161 1
zentrreg 0.4739 0.2648 1
quinn_openn 0.0361 0.1657 -0.0209 1
uewp 0.4081 -0.4353 -0.0743 -0.0676 1
poden 0.5095 -0.1072 0.61 -0.0669 -0.0076 1
centr -0.0517 -0.049 -0.4859 0.0721 0.2763 -0.3271 1
Table A7b: Correlation matrix NUTS 2-level: explanatory variables
gccfeu gdp zentrreg quinn_openn uewp poden centr
gccfeu 1
gdp -0.3152 1
zentrreg 0.2018 0.4548 1
quinn_openn 0.0147 0.1289 -0.0093 1
uewp 0.2367 -0.1423 -0.0344 -0.0671 1
poden 0.2547 0.0684 0.618 -0.0448 -0.0345 1
centr -0.0631 0.0062 -0.3231 0.0886 0.4613 -0.2537 128
Table A8: Robustness estimates, 1985-94, pooled regressions
NUTS 2 NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 1 NUTS 2 NUTS 1
IV 2SLS dynamic model logit terms estimation capital market integration
constant 0.2943 0.2835 constant 0.0387 0.0087 constant -0.7781 -0.9509 constant 0.3254 0.2809
7.31 6.17 1.36 0.33 -4.94 -5.4 8.71 6.95
gccfeu AR(1) 0.7623 0.7769
23.24 17.08
gdp (IV) -0.0009 -0.0005 gdp -0.0002 -0.0001 gdp -0.0041 -0.0021 gdp -0.0009 -0.0005
-6.85 -3.71 -2.58 -1.84 -7.25 -3.84 -7.28 -3.76
zentrreg 0.2371 0.1563 zentrreg 0.0602 0.0551 zentrreg 0.9874 0.6541 zentrreg 0.2328 0.1552
8.00 6.36 2.89 3.38 8.24 6.71 8.44 6.81
uewp (IV) 0.0075 0.0061 uewp 0.0014 0.0016 uewp 0.0307 0.0277 uewp 0.0073 0.0066
6.74 4.59 1.95 2.00 7.22 5.5 7.5 5.62
poden -0.0141 0.0315 poden -0.0019 0.0049 poden -0.0511 0.1461 poden -0.0132 0.0323
-1.95 4.78 -0.40 1.38 -1.75 5.56 -1.96 5.26
area -0.0020 0.0002 area -0.0004 0.0001 area -0.0082 0.0010 area -0.0021 0.0002
-3.46 0.86 -1.00 0.99 -3.62 1.22 -3.94 1.04
quinn_openn 0.0078 0.0064 quinn_openn 0.0045 0.0045 quinn_openn 0.0282 0.0282 quinn_ca 0.0200 0.0207
2.75 1.89 2.41 2.57 2.5 2.12 2.11 1.96
centr 0.1269 0.0353 centr 0.0342 0.0346 centr 0.5121 0.1440 centr 0.1238 0.0359
6.31 1.53 2.48 2.45 6.35 1.59 6.65 1.69
dum_fra -0.0196 -0.0485 dum_fra -0.0021 -0.0091 dum_fra -0.0887 -0.2172 dum_fra -0.0185 -0.0480
-1.72 -3.14 -0.29 -1.07 -1.96 -3.58 -1.72 -3.3
dum_bel 0.0963 -0.0426 dum_bel 0.0213 0.0047 dum_bel 0.3992 -0.1964 dum_bel 0.0909 -0.0437
6.41 -2.17 2.06 0.45 6.58 -2.51 6.51 -2.39
dum_ire -0.0353 -0.0753 dum_ire 0.0089 -0.0256 dum_den -0.5318 -0.6208 dum_den -0.1237 -0.1480
-0.63 -2.01 0.24 -1.22 -2.96 -4.66 -2.99 -4.75
dum_lux -0.2111 -0.1156 dum_lux -0.0822 -0.0237 dum_ire -0.2406 -0.4164 dum_ire -0.0455 -0.0925
-4.77 -2.92 -2.79 -1.14 -1.07 -2.8 -0.88 -2.67
dum_den -0.1249 -0.1457 dum_den -0.0316 -0.0341 dum_lux -0.8493 -0.4059 dum_lux -0.1978 -0.0928
-2.80 -4.34 -1.07 -1.76 -4.78 -2.62 -4.83 -2.56
dum_ukd --- 0.0069 dum_ukd --- --- dum_ukd --- -0.0040 dum_ukd --- -0.0071
0.59 -0.09 -0.64
no. obs. 431 259 no. obs. 431 192 no. obs. 487 292 no. obs. 487 292
Prob F 0.0000 0.0000 Prob Chi
2
0.0000 0.0000 Prob Chi
2
0.0000 0.0000 Prob Chi
2
0.0000 0.0000
Note: GDP and UEWP have been instrumented by their first lag. T-values are given in the IV-estimates, z-values for the dynamic model.